Imagine a pizza maker working with a ball of dough. She might use a spatula to lift the dough onto a cutting board then use a rolling pin to flatten it into a circle. Easy, right? Not if this pizza maker is a robot.Imagine a pizza maker working with a ball of dough. She might use a spatula to lift the dough onto a cutting board then use a rolling pin to flatten it into a circle. Easy, right? Not if this pizza maker is a robot.
Over the past few decades, technological advances have opened new and exciting possibilities for both remote tourism and the teleoperation of robotic systems. This allowed computer scientists to develop increasingly sophisticated systems that allow humans to virtually visit remote locations in immersive ways.Over the past few decades, technological advances have opened new and exciting possibilities for both remote tourism and the teleoperation of robotic systems. This allowed computer scientists to develop increasingly sophisticated systems that allow humans to virtually visit remote locations in immersive ways.
Energy Innovation partners with the independent nonprofit Aspen Global Change Institute (AGCI) to provide climate and energy research updates. The research synopsis below comes from AGCI Program Director Emily Jack-Scott and a full list of AGCI’s updates covering recent climate change and clean energy pathways research is available online at https://www.agci.org/solutions/quarterly-research-reviews
To say that the European energy system is at a crossroads is an understatement. Countries across Europe are already deep into a generational shift away from fossil fuels and toward greater efficiency, electrification, and integration of renewables. Against this backdrop, Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine is now dramatically altering Europe’s energy equation with some European governments pledging to accelerate their shift to renewables in a bid to break from reliance on Russian oil and natural gas.
As European nations operationalize their commitments to the Paris Agreement, policymakers from across the EU and the UK are promoting the creation of more renewable energy communities (RECs). RECs are renewable energy projects sited near groups of local shareholders or owners where individual households benefit from “prosumership,” consuming affordable renewable energy they produce in exchange for direct investments in infrastructure and governance. Collectively, RECs hold promise for scaling up decentralized renewable energy production across Europe. REC proponents cite additional benefits, including harnessing the power of individual households, improving buy-in for renewable energy, building new skills among REC members, and democratizing the energy transition. In light of events in Ukraine, there may be an even greater premium placed on such infrastructure.
Workers carry a solar panel to be installed on the roof of Balcombe primary school, as part of a community owned renewable energy project. Source: Simuove, Wikimedia Commons. 19 February 2016.
European policymakers also view renewable energy communities as central to their efforts to ensure a just energy transition. In theory, RECs have the potential to empower communities and benefit energy-vulnerable and energy-poor households. This intention is made explicit in the European Commission’s latest renewable energy directive (RED II), which outlines how renewable energy communities should be accessible to all, including low-income and vulnerable households.
But how does this play out in practice? A series of recent research and review articles caution against the broad-stroke assumption that RECs automatically produce greater energy justice and alleviate energy poverty. The authors argue that unless critically acknowledged and addressed, RECs could actually exacerbate socioeconomic divides and further disadvantage vulnerable communities. But local and national policies can address potential pitfalls and ensure that RECs can indeed be a mechanism for energy justice in the transition.
Over the last couple decades, the theory of energy justice continues to mature in peer-reviewed literature. As outlined in a past AGCI research review, energy justice frameworks can be useful in examining energy policies and projects through the lens of distributive, procedural, and recognitional justice. Analyzing their 2021 survey of dozens of RECs across Europe, Hanke and colleagues found significant injustices across all three dimensions of energy justice.
Despite close proximity to renewable energy installations, the majority of RECs lacked diverse representation. Rather, membership skewed significantly toward those with the time, education, and financial resources required to establish RECs: retired men with expertise in engineering or other technical training. In a 2020 article, Hanke & Lowitzsch outlined related behavioral economics that exacerbate this trend –namely, that low-income individuals are burdened with worries, decisions, and time constraints that compromise their bandwidth to consider energy alternatives. Consequently, they often opt to stick with a known option, even when the alternative may be cost-beneficial.
In addition, Hanke et al. (2021) found that REC shareholders regularly lacked awareness or understanding of local energy poverty and vulnerability needs, or engaged with marginalized groups (a recognition injustice). Without such knowledge, most RECs did not implement procedures to address energy poverty, broaden engagement with marginalized groups, or establish financial resources to address these shortcomings (procedural injustice). As a result, the majority of European RECs sampled did not provide benefits (such as lower energy prices or greater energy efficiency services) to local vulnerable populations (distributional injustice).
Van Bommel and Höffken went one step further in their 2021 review article to examine how distributional, procedural, and recognitional energy justice lenses play out within, between, and beyond energy communities. Within RECs, they found a similar skewing of membership toward men from high socioeconomic groups, with associated inequitable distribution of benefits. This can translate into tensions between renewable energy community members who reap the financial benefits of a renewable energy installation and those who do not (disproportionately women and those from marginalized groups), despite all community members living near the same installation.
Between RECs and other energy system actors, injustices can play out in several ways. Some REC members have felt coerced into participating in renewable energy installations or “bribed” by developers to have installations sited near their communities in exchange for cheaper prices. This dynamic runs counter to RED II’s intended purpose to create initiatives that empower local communities for a common good. A further looming tension accompanying the decentralization of energy production is the shift of fundamental responsibility to provide reliable power (especially on the national scale) from governments to citizens.
Beyond individual RECs in Europe, van Brommel & Höffken underscore structural factors that impede equitable opportunities to participate in RECs. Without training and incentives that specifically target marginalized populations, RECs will continue to benefit relatively well-resourced socioeconomic groups, amplifying existing social divides. Additionally, the authors note RECs are not (and should not be) in a position to address the substantial injustices inherent in the production of renewable energy infrastructure, including resource mining, shipping, and waste disposal.
Policymakers looking to shape and support RECs often navigate competing interests and realities. As van Brommel & Höffken, as well as Hoicka and colleagues, emphasize, policy must embrace a broad array of REC models in order to meet each community’s individual context while ensuring that REC structures aren’t coopted by corporate players seeking to take advantage of REC’s commercial potential. Laws and governance around RECs should be kept as simple and straightforward as possible to avoid becoming a barrier to entry into such communities. At the same time, policymakers must revise existing procedures to broaden REC participation among vulnerable and marginalized populations.
Different investment and ownerships models can also make entry for low-income households more feasible. Many early-adopter RECs use a cooperative model in which each household is afforded equal weight in decision-making, regardless of shareholder percentage. While very egalitarian in theory, in practice this approach has favored buy-in among those with substantial resources to engage (whether know-how, finances, or time). It also requires sizable upfront equity to install infrastructure.
Hoicka et al. as well as Hanke & Lowitzsch both emphasize that opting for an alternate model, such as a trustee scheme (Figure 1), can lessen the burden of upfront investment and facilitate entry for low-income households. In a trustee scheme, an intermediary (the trustee) secures a loan for the acquisition of infrastructure, which can be paid off upfront (for those who are financially able) or in monthly payments (in lieu of monthly energy bills). In this structure, the trustee must act in the interest of the household shareholders, and votes are weighted by percentage of ownership (RED II governance models already require that no REC shareholder owns more than 33 percent of assets). Van Bommel & Höffken caution that this approach can depart from a more egalitarian voting structure, but that low-income households benefit immensely from having an intermediary serve as a knowledgeable advocate through the process, as well as from lower upfront investments.
Figure 2. Structure of a trusteed scheme ownership model for renewable energy communities. Source: Hoicka et al. 2021.
In addition to ownership models, there are other levers that can reduce financial barriers to entry for low-income and vulnerable populations. Typically, owners of RECs make an initial investment with long-term payback timeframes. This type of return on investment is often not appealing or feasible for low-income households focused on how to pay their monthly energy bill. Hanke & Lowitzsch recommend providing grants, subsidies, and zero- or low-interest loans to low-income households to enter into RECs. Relatedly, van Brommel & Höffken propose having dedicated funding for establishing RECs that meet diversity metrics.
Van Bommel & Höffken advocate for greater national policy stability to make RECs sustainable. While establishing RECs requires a substantial investment of community members’ time and resources, they can be short-lived when changing national politics alter policies and support structures too quickly. This is especially important when seeking to expand energy justice through RECs. Low-income and vulnerable households can better engage in the process through financial incentives, but these must be reliably maintained. Likewise, national and regional actors should engage in steady partnerships with existing, trusted non-governmental organizations to aid in skill-building, awareness, and capacity for low-income and vulnerable households (Hanke & Lowitzsch 2020).
As RECs continue to grow in number and size, they will have greater political power. But, as van Brommel & Höffken point out, the onus for structural changes to drive decarbonization of national energy systems must remain with national governments. Similarly, it should remain up to national-level actors to rectify energy injustices. With energy justice as a central focus of RED II, assessment of these metrics in relation to RECs must also consider transnational injustices in the sourcing, transport, and disposal of renewable energy infrastructure.
The post Europe’s Energy Transition: Can Renewable Energy Communities Lead To Greater Energy Justice? appeared first on Energy Innovation: Policy and Technology.
As European nations operationalize their commitments to the Paris Agreement, policymakers from across the EU and the UK are promoting the creation of more renewable energy communities (RECs) to scale up decentralized renewable energy production across Europe. However, researchers argue that RECs could actually exacerbate socioeconomic divides. Local and national policies can address potential pitfalls and ensure that RECs can indeed be a mechanism for energy justice in the transition.
The post Europe’s Energy Transition: Can Renewable Energy Communities Lead To Greater Energy Justice? appeared first on Energy Innovation: Policy and Technology.
By Shelley Wenzel
This week, Energy Innovation launched the Oregon Energy Policy Simulator (EPS), our newest state-specific, open-source, peer-reviewed, and nonpartisan model that estimates the environmental, economic, and public health impacts of hundreds of climate and energy policies. The Oregon EPS joins our other state models, including California, Colorado, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, and Virginia.
Recent climate policies in Oregon have established the state as a climate leader, including a stronger transportation sector clean fuels standard, new zero-emission medium- and heavy-duty truck standards, and legislation establishing a timeline to fully decarbonize the power sector by 2040. Nevertheless, state policymakers must take additional action to achieve Oregon’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions targets of at least 45 percent below 1990 emissions by 2035 and at least 80 percent below by 2050.
The Oregon EPS can help state policymakers measure progress and design additional emissions reductions policies in the buildings, transportation, land use, and industry sectors. Modeling results show that increased ambition is not only possible, but that it creates dramatic economic, employment, and public health benefits.
When layered on top of current state policies, a deep decarbonization scenario, consistent with the U.S. Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Climate Agreement (NDC Scenario), would cut economy-wide emissions 50 percent in 2035 and 74 percent in 2050 compared to 1990 levels. The NDC Scenario would also increase Oregon’s gross domestic product (GDP) by almost $4 billion annually, create more than 18,000 jobs, and avoid nearly 60 premature deaths and 900 asthma attacks annually in the year 2050.
Energy Innovation conducted analysis outlining five scenarios modeled with the Oregon EPS: the Business as Usual (BAU) Scenario, two Recent Policy Development scenarios, the Example Climate Protection Program (CPP) Scenario, and the NDC Scenario. The table below summarizes this research, showing total emissions under each policy scenario, along with the percentage of GHG emissions reductions below 1990 levels in 2035 and 2050 for each scenario.
Overall, we find that a strong electric vehicle (EV) sales standard and an EV subsidy, adopting fuel efficiency standards and supporting charging infrastructure buildout for EVs, and replacing fossil fuel equipment in buildings and industry with electric and other zero-carbon alternatives will be critical for cutting carbon emissions and consumer costs, while creating significant jobs and public health benefits.
Table 1. EPS policy scenario results in 2035 and 2050 relative to EO 20-04 emissions goals of 45 percent reductions below 1990 levels by 2035 and 80 percent by 2050. Emissions in this table exclude the land use and land-use change sector. *The modeled CPP Scenario does not explicitly include the ~2.5 MMT of assumed Community Climate Investments (explained in the CPP footnote). Including Community Climate Investments, 2050 emissions would be 24 MMT, or a 60 percent reduction relative to 1990 emissions.
The BAU Scenario estimates Oregon’s emissions trajectory prior to 2021 policy developments. With electricity as its own sector, Oregon’s two largest-emitting sectors in 2019 were transportation and electricity, at 35 percent and 29 percent of 2019 GHG emissions, respectively.[1] However as shown in Figure 1, when emissions from electricity generation are reallocated to the demand sectors, the GHG emissions breakdown by sector is as follows: 35 percent for transportation, 34 percent for buildings, 19 percent for industry, and 10 percent for agriculture. Decarbonizing electricity is crucial, especially within the buildings sector, since buildings create the largest electricity demand by a significant margin—at almost 70 percent.
Figure 1. Oregon’s 2019 GHG emissions from Oregon DEQ’s GHG Sector-Based Inventory, with electricity emissions reallocated to respective demand sectors. Elements of the Inventory have been recategorized in line with the classification system used by the EPS.
In 2021, Oregon initiated rulemaking for the recently expanded Oregon Clean Fuels Program targets, passed legislation requiring retail electricity providers to reduce GHG emissions of electricity sold to consumers 100 percent below baseline by 2040 (HB2021), and adopted the Clean Trucks Rule. The “Recent Policy Developments – No Added Imports Scenario” (No Added Imports Scenario) and the “Recent Policy Developments – Added Wind and Solar Imports Scenario” (Added Wind and Solar Imports Scenario) bookend the range of expected electricity sector emissions due to uncertainty around the state’s reliance on imported electricity.
In these scenarios, transportation sector emissions decrease 3 percent in 2035 and 15 percent in 2050 compared to the BAU Scenario. The scenarios also add jobs, averaging nearly 500 new jobs in the year 2050. Results also show an increase in GDP compared to the BAU Scenario, with the No Added Imports Scenario forecasting $40 million and the Added Wind and Solar Imports Scenario forecasting $140 million in added GDP in 2050. Oregon EPS findings also show public health benefits due to reductions in air pollution from burning fossil fuels, with approximately 200 avoided asthma attacks annually by 2050. The resulting emissions reductions and avoided health impacts are also estimated to avoid $1.5 billion in damages annually by 2050.[2]
Oregon’s new Climate Protection Program (CPP) mandates an emissions cap for covered natural gas and transportation fuels rather than specific policy actions. Because the CPP does not yet have a clear policy set to implement the goals, we include an example CPP Scenario, which models one possible pathway by adding new policies and strengthening current policies on top of what is already included in the No Added Imports Scenario. The scenario uses a combination of policy levers to meet the annual emissions caps specified by the CPP. Results show the Example CPP Scenario creates nearly 9,600 jobs and generates $2.5 billion in GDP in 2050, while also avoiding 600 asthma attacks and 40 premature deaths annually in 2050. On a percent change basis, we find avoided deaths are greater for people of color—the percentage reduction in premature deaths is 40 to 90 percent greater for people identifying as Black, Asian, or ‘other race,’ compared to people identifying as white. Monetized health and climate benefits reach almost $3.1 billion in 2050, amounting to a cumulative $49 billion through 2050.
The NDC Scenario delivers the greatest emissions reductions, adapted from a nationwide policy scenario developed by EI to meet the U.S. NDC of 50 to 52 percent below 2010 emissions by 2030.[3] When layered on top of current state policies, this scenario reduces economy-wide emissions 50 percent in 2035 and 74 percent in 2050 compared to 1990 levels. Some of the policies implemented in this scenario include an EV sales standard paired with an EV subsidy lasting through 2030, policies to increase Oregon’s grid-scale electricity storage potential and adding transmission capacity, industry standards for clean fuel usage and lower process emissions, and improved energy efficiency in buildings paired with transitioning buildings away from burning fossil fuels. Figure 2 illustrates the deep GHG emissions reductions attributed to each policy and compared to Oregon’s BAU trajectory.
Figure 2. “Wedge” chart for the NDC Scenario. This graph shows GHG emissions excluding Oregon’s land use and land use change sector, consistent with the fact Oregon’s EO targets do not include land use. However, land use policies are included in the NDC Scenario showing additional carbon sequestration opportunities in the bottom striped wedges. Note this wedge chart aggregates some policy levers to improve figure readability; a full interactive wedge graph is available on the Oregon EPS.
In total, NDC scenario investments would increase the state’s GDP by almost $4 billion annually and create more than 18,000 jobs in 2050. This broader set of climate policies would also improve public health due to reductions in harmful air pollution from burning fossil fuels. The Oregon EPS estimates the NDC Scenario policies would avoid approximately 30 premature deaths and 400 asthma attacks annually in 2035; these numbers increase to nearly 60 avoided premature deaths and 900 asthma attacks annually by 2050. Like in the CPP scenario, we find that the percentage reduction in premature deaths is 50 to 90 percent greater for people identifying as Black, Asian, or ‘other race,’ compared to people identifying as white.
Figure 3. Projected changes in GDP relative to BAU in the NDC Scenario.
Oregon has one of the fastest timelines in the nation for achieving clean power and has also adopted ambitious policies for decarbonizing transportation. Additional policies, particularly focused on electrification of transportation and buildings, can leverage this transition to achieve deeper decarbonization. EI’s NDC Scenario provides one possible policy pathway to cut emissions and achieve climate goals, while successfully growing the economy and creating new jobs. The Oregon EPS can help state policymakers measure progress and design effective emissions reductions policies in the buildings, transportation, land use, and industry sectors.
Notes
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The new Oregon Energy Policy Solutions model helps policymakers measure progress and design additional emissions reduction policies. Oregon EPS modeling finds more ambitious climate policies could cut emissions 74 percent and add $4 billion to the state’s economy by 2050.
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Energy Innovation partners with the independent nonprofit Aspen Global Change Institute (AGCI) to provide climate and energy research updates. The research synopsis below comes from AGCI Research Director Julie A. Vano, and a full list of AGCI’s quarterly research updates covering recent climate change research on clean energy pathways is available online at https://www.agci.org/solutions/quarterly-research-reviews
Extreme weather events. Supply-chain shortages. Economic fallout. The disruptions of the past two years are increasing unease about future risks among global policymakers, prompting more careful consideration of how to include climate change in risk assessments.
Business leaders are among those rethinking how they evaluate climate risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), a group established by the Financial Stability Board to develop a framework for disclosing climate risks and opportunities, released a 2017 report that explains two types of climate-related risks businesses can face: First, risks related to the transition to a lower-carbon economy, including changing customer behavior, costs to adopt lower-emissions technologies, and increased exposure to litigation. Second, risks related to doing business in a changing physical environment, including increasingly severe extreme weather events, changing precipitation patterns, rising temperatures, and sea-level rise. Both types of risk vary considerably based on business type, size, and location.
As awareness of these types of climate risks grows, more businesses are struggling to quantify climate change impacts and source the data needed to help evaluate the risks identified by the TCFD. In recent years, the number of organizations pledging to support the TCFD’s landmark 2017 recommendations for disclosing information about climate risks and opportunities has increased rapidly. As of October 2021, these organizations included 1,069 financial institutions responsible for assets of $194 trillion (2021 TCFD).
To address businesses’ growing thirst for climate-related financial risk information, Tanya Fiedler of the University of Sydney Business School and Andy Pitman of the Climate Change Research Centre, UNSW, Sydney, mobilized an interdisciplinary team with climate science, accounting, and business expertise. In their 2021 perspective on “Business risk and the emergence of climate analytics” for Nature Climate Change, Fiedler and colleagues outline the challenges and suggest a new path to improve the use of climate science to inform how businesses assess their climate-related financial risk.
Petabytes of tempting data
Climate scientists often use global climate models (or Earth system models) to understand climate change impacts. These models represent physical laws captured in computer code and simulated on supercomputers at research centers around the world. They help climate scientists better understand how greenhouse gases are increasing surface temperatures, how hydrologic cycles are amplified by warming (making wet periods wetter and dry periods drier), and how landmasses and the Arctic are warming more rapidly (Palmer and Stevens 2019).
Over the years, global climate models have provided more simulations, at finer spatial resolutions, generating petabytes of data (one petabyte could hold 4,000 photo downloads a day for a lifetime). Open-access data from these models are available online and may seem to offer a crystal ball for businesses to assess their future climate-related risk.
In reality, identifying and applying fit-for-purpose climate model data appropriately is a major challenge that, while not new, is more important than ever. As Fiedler and colleagues point out, “the misuse of climate models risks a range of issues, including maladaptation and heightened vulnerability of business to climate change, an overconfidence in assessments of risk, material misstatement of risk in financial reports and the creation of greenwash.”
Mismatched tools
While climate scientists and economists both use models to better understand future conditions, their modeling platforms and how the data outputs should be interpreted are very different. For example, climate models generate data by solving equations, which provide highly precise numbers. This precision is a modeling artifact and should not be confused with accuracy. Not acknowledging this or many other nuances could result in a false sense of security. As such, the use of global climate model data to assess climate-change risk must be done with careful consideration.
Fiedler and colleagues outline numerous qualifiers and precautions to prevent misuse of global climate model output at different spatial and temporal scales.
For climate information used for analysis at global and continental scales in 2050 to 2100: Global climate model simulations are designed for this regional extent and time period. An ensemble of independent models can be used to estimate projected temperature changes and their range of uncertainty, focusing on average changes. Global models should not, however, be relied on to capture low-probability, high-impact events.
For analysis at smaller-than-continental scales: Most global climate model simulations divide the globe into pixels of around 100 x 100 kilometers or coarser. The data they produce is not intended to be used to evaluate change in a specific location or physical asset. Techniques that “downscale” the information using dynamical or statistical methods can add value but should be employed with keen attention to the value (and biases) the new information provides.
For analysis in 2020 to 2050: Global climate models simulate climate variability, capturing the natural swings in warmer/cooler or wetter/drier periods at sub-regional scales that can last a decade or two. As such, it is difficult to distinguish the differences between higher- and lower-emissions pathways before mid-century.
For analysis of climate extremes: Extreme events, by definition, are rare and therefore less well understood. Important research is underway to explore how 1-in-100-year events are simulated in global models, but results are not robust enough for most applications, especially in the context of business decisions.
For analysis at the scale of a physical asset: For all the reasons outlined above, the information most desired in financial decision making—local changes in extreme weather events—is not what global climate models provide. Fortunately, there are alternative ways to assess climate impacts, but these can require careful region- and investment-specific evaluations.
A better way to match climate information with risk analysis
While the direct use of climate change data may not be a panacea, Fiedler and colleagues chart a path (Figure 1b) showing how climate science can help businesses and their investors, lenders, and insurance underwriters make informed economic decisions.
a. Current connections between climate research (blue shading) and business (pink shading), via scenarios, open access data archives and climate service providers. b. Redefining the connection between business and climate research. Source: Figure and caption from Fielder et al. 2020.
In their paper, the authors illustrate the current approach to connecting climate research and business (Figure 1a), where information usually flows in one direction. In some cases, climate service providers, sometimes in collaboration with financial sector experts (e.g., asset managers, banks, credit rating agencies), assist by combining information with other data to help assess an entity’s risk profile. However, those types of analyses are too often proprietary, and their scientific merit is difficult to assess.
As an alternative, Figure 1b illustrates how climate projections could be professionalized to inform business needs. Using both “climate service” and “operational prediction” intermediaries would provide mechanisms to facilitate the flow of information in both directions, as indicated by up and down arrows and the mixing of pink and blue at the boundaries.
This new paradigm emphasizes the need for more effective communication between business and climate science and reliance on expert judgment. Fielder and colleagues propose establishing “climate translators” as a new group of professionals who could help operationalize climate services by facilitating more direct engagement between climate scientists and businesses and bringing greater transparency to the value and limits of climate model information for business purposes.
Also, while climate models will continue to advance, it is wise not to wait for better information from them. Instead, there are alternative ways to use existing climate science to assess financial risks and minimize vulnerabilities. For example, examining how one’s business has been affected by weather variability in the past (five to 10 years, and longer if possible) can help uncover how specific events disrupt operations and supply chains and provide information that can be used to limit those vulnerabilities in the future.
A path forward
The increased awareness and desire to better understand a business’s climate risk has elevated the importance of both climate mitigation and adaptation. However, doing this work well requires more understanding of how to meet the financial sector’s needs. Fiedler and colleagues emphasize this will not simply be solved by open access to data or by climate service providers re-packaging information. Instead, they call for a redesign: “To meet the needs of the financial sector, regulators and business, climate projections need to be developed, undertaken and provided at the same level of professionalism as weather services.”
This call to action is being echoed by others in the financial sector and beyond. The TCFD (2021) reported that the key challenges for those preparing financial impact disclosures were difficulties in obtaining relevant climate risk-related data and selecting and applying assessment methodologies. Of note, these challenges were reported three times more often than other challenges related to financial impact disclosure including disclosure requirements or lack of buy-in from organizations.
Similar dialogues are underway in the water sector (Addressing the “Practitioners’ Dilemma”: Climate Information Evaluation for Practical Applications in the Water Sector) and energy sector (Navigating the Clean Energy Transition in a Changing Climate). These efforts are taking stock of ongoing work to produce decision-relevant climate information, evaluate the fitness of that information, and characterize its uncertainty in ways that facilitate an entity’s ability to effectively mitigate or adapt to these risks.
Common themes highlighted by these various efforts include the need for increased transparency, the ability to embrace probabilistic thinking, and finding a more systematic approach to assessment of climate science for applications. These needs can be met by more open discourse between the science community and financial sector—an exchange that could help drive scientific innovations that better support what climate-resilient businesses need.
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As awareness of climate risks grows, more businesses are struggling to quantify climate change impacts, but applying climate model data appropriately is a major challenge. Researchers are identifying new ways climate science can help businesses, investors, and insurance underwriters make more informed decisions.
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Energy Innovation partners with the independent nonprofit Aspen Global Change Institute (AGCI) to provide climate and energy research updates. The research synopsis below comes from AGCI Program Director Emily Jack-Scott and a full list of AGCI’s updates covering recent climate change and clean energy pathways research is available online at https://www.agci.org/solutions/quarterly-research-reviews
People around the world are increasingly aware of and impacted by climate change, which is connected unsurprisingly with a parallel uptick in associated mental health stress. A rich body of research examines the psychologies of how individuals and communities perceive and respond to climate change information, but peer-reviewed publications about the impacts of climate change on mental health are just emerging.
Recent review articles authored by Ojala and colleagues in 2021 as well as by Cianconi and colleagues in 2020 highlight the challenges of studying this area along with the lack of representation in current research among those most vulnerable to, and those most impacted by climate change.
Tackling climate change will require economic and social transformation, but this level of change can only be achieved with political pressure from a critical mass of individuals and communities spanning demographics, socio-economic status, and geographies. Achieving and sustaining that level of action requires that people are not incapacitated by climate anxiety or despair.
As Ojala and colleagues note, people are best able to cope with climate change when they feel empowered to act. As Hayes and colleagues wrote in a 2018 debate article, taking action can make the difference between a person feeling passively hopeful for a different future or actively hopeful in ways that fuel progress toward achieving that future. But providing supportive services requires a better understanding of climate change’s effects on the mental health of all people. This is especially urgent and needed for those experiencing the worst impacts of climate change, which are disproportionately from marginalized and Indigenous communities.
Understanding the convergence of two of our world’s most intricate systems (the natural environment amidst a changing climate and the human mind) is no small feat. Researchers must parse diverse variables (pre-existing mental conditions, demographics, culture, religion, geo-politics, to name a few), before they can attribute causal (as opposed to correlative) pathways. Challenges like these can make it very difficult to determine if a person becomes depressed because of climate change or if a pre-existing depression colors their concerns for a changing climate.
Further complicating matters, we must measure a whole range of mental health impacts. Cianconi and Ojala point to associations between climate change and depression, anxiety, grief, despair, existential worry, personality disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), aggressive behavior, insomnia, substance abuse, and even suicide.
Climate change stressors affect people’s mental well-being through many pathways: worrying about loved ones’ safety in the short- and long-term; challenges to self-identity and esteem; anticipated and realized loss of valued places, livelihoods, and people.
These varying mental and behavioral states are measured through an array of methodologies (from surveys to case study analysis, interviews, and experimental studies), further complicating any direct comparison across research projects, even when they are focused on relatively similar scenarios.
Timescale is another key variable in making causal attributions. Climate change is unfolding over years and decades, but is punctuated by extreme events, which can take place over minutes, hours, days, or months. Associated mental health impacts can be immediate or develop over longer timeframes.
The impacts of extreme events on the human psyche can be direct and indirect. For example, a heat wave may have immediate, direct mental health effects—spiking rates of aggression, mood disorders, schizophrenia, or mania. Near-term, indirect impacts can surface for flood survivors as they grapple with loss of life or infrastructure and economic disruptions that fuel anxiety, depression, or PTSD. Those forced to permanently migrate as sea levels rise, for example, correlate with long-term, indirect psychological impacts such as higher rates of anxiety, depression, PTSD, aggression, and substance abuse, among others.
These psychological impacts can affect those who live through events as well as subsequent generations due to the lasting influence of mental illnesses on families and communities.
Teasing out the various contributors and psychological impacts is all the more difficult in the midst of a global pandemic, which has degraded mental health around the world. Marazziti and colleagues recently published a review paper on the simultaneous negative psychological impacts of climate change, air pollution, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Their review points to a potential compounding effect, wherein these separate stressors amplify one another (Figure 1).
Graphical abstract illustrating the convergence of stressors cause by climate change, air pollution, and the COVID-19 pandemic on mental health. Source: Marazziti et al. 2021.
For all its complexity, these authors (and many others) agree upon the urgent need to diversify how this research is done.
Grappling with present and future climate change can be challenging for all people, but the mental health toll is greater for those living with legacies of oppression. However, the vast majority of research on mental health and climate change has been conducted in Australia, Canada, Europe, and the United States with research subjects largely of European descent. Yet research studying climate change’s effects on the mental health of marginalized and Indigenous populations confirms their mental health is often more deeply affected for a variety of reasons.
Legacies of systemic disempowerment mean marginalized populations often live in ecosystems, neighborhoods, and locations experiencing the first and worst impacts of climate change (often referred to as “vulnerable” or “frontline” locations). The near- and long-term impacts of extreme events also exacerbate existing mental illnesses and socio-economic divides. And marginalized communities often lack adequate resources or access to political power to address such impacts.
For Indigenous peoples, these stressors are compounded by cultures that are often tied to the land. Both the near-term and long-term degradation of environments and the climate deeply impact cultural and psychological well-being. Colonization, forced relocation and assimilation have already disrupted traditional livelihoods, food sources, and cultural and spiritual practices. The anticipated or confirmed need to relocate amplifies existing intergenerational traumas.
In a 2015 viewpoint article, Bowles anticipates climate change will further diminish the availability of traditional food sources for Indigenous Australians, forcing greater migration. Displaced people are then more likely to end up in locations and dominant systems that lead to cultural homogenization and assimilation, further amplifying mental health impacts and highlighting the need for culturally-sensitive mental health services, co-developed with marginalized and Indigenous peoples.
Similar trends emerge in a 2022 review article by Lebel and colleagues about climate change-associated mental health impacts and responses among Indigenous peoples in the Circumpolar North. Climate change-driven disturbances to land, food availability, mobility, and associated cultural practices have eroded mental well-being and triggered the reemergence of past trauma (Figure 2).
Figure 2 The mental health-related impacts of environmental changes in the Circumpolar North. Source: Lebel et al. 2018.
Mental health can be systematically integrated into climate adaptation strategies via many opportunities including providing greater funding during policy development, better monitoring of mental responses during emergency responses, integrating mental health protocols into disaster preparation and response, and factoring mental health into community-based resilience plans (Hayes et al. 2018).
For individuals from marginalized groups, community-driven approaches to mental health supports will be more effective than top-down approaches. Self-designed mental health services can avoid the risk of imposing external approaches to mental health that force new modes of cultural assimilation. Many marginalized communities have traditional knowledge about how to navigate mental health needs in changing environmental conditions, but their capacity and resources to provide services are disproportionately compromised.
For example, Bowles describes Indigenous Australians’ traditional knowledge of social structures has historically supported adaptation in the face of harsh environmental changes. But a legacy of colonialism has compromised the adaptive capacity of Indigenous individuals, households, and communities. Existing health care infrastructure and services are under-resourced compared to the high physical and mental health needs of the population. Lack of access to education, resources, and political influence create barriers to designing and expanding these services. Bowles argues that greater external resources are needed, and at higher-than-average rates per person in the country, in order to provide adequate support for Indigenous mental health conditions associated with climate change.
Similarly, Lebel and colleagues outline effective sources of psychological resilience among Indigenous people in the Circumpolar North (Figure 2), all of which are deeply rooted in maintaining strong social and cultural ties. The authors also underscore the importance of addressing socio-economic disparities. Financial and other resources can serve as a significant buffer against mental health burdens associated with climate impacts.
Research and solution-seeking must center marginalized populations in order to effectively and equitably build mental health structures. Increasing representation among mental health research authors, subjects, and case studies is one step toward understanding and addressing these disparities. Co-creating early interventions and redressing existing shortcomings in mental health services in marginalized communities now, will ensure the services are available as climate change accelerates.
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This research review highlight the challenges of studying the mental health impacts of climate change along with the lack of representation in current research of those most vulnerable to and most impacted by climate change.
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Today, Energy Innovation updated the United States Energy Policy Simulator (EPS), our open-source, peer-reviewed, and nonpartisan model that estimates the environmental, economic, and health impacts of hundreds of climate and energy policies.
Version 3.3.1 adds several new features to the previously released 3.3 model platform. For example, the model now accounts for vehicle insurance, parking, licensing and registration costs, and tracks changes in the amount of money paid for passenger transport fares. It also includes several new graphs showing total energy use by sector and greater flexibility in settings for power plant and fuel subsidies and taxes.
The abatement cost curves above demonstrate the improved accuracy of the transportation mode shifting costs in this example policy package (left-most box).
The latest launch also includes several data improvements such as updating the U.S. business-as-usual (BAU) trajectory to reflect the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act, which will phase down the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons, and to update BAU carbon capture and sequestration deployment. The new features are available online now, and a full list of updates is available on our Version History page. If you would like to introduce any friends or colleagues to the EPS, the EPS Video Series provides the best possible introduction to the tool. They can also jump right in and begin playing with the simulator in its web interface.
Sign up to hear about new updates to the Energy Policy Simulator model, new regions covered by the tool, and new insights from our research.
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U.S. Energy Policy Simulator 3.3.1 adds several new features covering the transportation and power sectors, and includes data improvements like an updated business-as-usual trajectory to reflect the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act as well as carbon capture and sequestration deployment.
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Energy Innovation partners with the independent nonprofit Aspen Global Change Institute (AGCI) to provide climate and energy research updates. The research synopsis below comes from AGCI Executive Director James Arnott, and a full list of AGCI’s quarterly research updates covering recent climate change research on clean energy pathways is available online at https://www.agci.org/solutions/quarterly-research-reviews
This blog is dedicated to the memory of Geert Jan van Oldenborgh, a pioneer in the attribution of extreme climate events. Van Oldenborgh passed away during the writing of this post. More about this scientist and the impact of his life work is available here.
The lived experience of much our planet’s life now reflects what scientists have long expected: extreme climate and weather events are increasing as our planet warms. In many cases, the most intense heatwaves, droughts, fires, and floods have become not only more frequent but also more severe. For instance, the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment of climate science finds that, globally, extreme heat events that used to occur once in every 50 years now happen nearly five times as often and are more than 1-degree Celsius (1.8 degrees Fahrenheit) hotter (IPCC, 2021).
These global trends raise local questions. Did global warming cause last week’s heat wave (or wildfire or flood or hurricane) in my hometown? Scientists treat this inquiry a bit like detective work, attempting to find a human “fingerprint” in climate and weather phenomena. Extreme events, by definition, are rare. This makes identifying fingerprints for just a single occurrence more difficult than attributing global trends in extremes to human-driven climate change (as the IPCC does with increasing confidence).
However, scientists are finding ways to produce so-called “attribution” studies. Analytical advances, along with communicating findings better, mean attribution studies are now more relevant for impacted communities, policymakers, and the media in the wake of a particular extreme event.
For example, an attribution study by Phillip et al. on the Western North America (WNA) heatwave that crippled the Pacific Northwest in the summer of 2021 produced striking results. The analysis compared observations of the heatwave to the simulated climate of the region without elevated levels of greenhouse gases (GHGs). The authors found events like the WNA heatwave would be 150 times less likely to occur in a natural climate.
Even in our current GHG-polluted climate, the event would be expected to occur only once every 1,000 years. Furthermore, the same analysis calculated that the probability of future extreme heatwaves would increase to one every five to ten years in a world that experiences 2°C of climate warming—a future we are rapidly approaching, and which national commitments made at the recent COP26 in Glasgow fall short of preventing.
Perhaps as remarkable as the findings of the WNA heatwave study is how, and how quickly, scientists were able to produce the results. The study was conducted and disseminated within nine days of the event (light speed in the academic time-space continuum). Applying the peer-reviewed methods from a team of scientists called World Weather Attribution (WWA) made this rapid response possible. Examples of other studies this group has released since 2017 are shown in the table below, produced in the wake of natural disasters like Hurricane Harvey, the Australian wildfires, and the extreme floods in Europe and Bangladesh.
Event (link to study)
Probability of occurrence in current climate
Probability of occurrence in 2º world
Attribution Summary
2021 Western North American Heatwave
About 1 in 1,000 years
1 in every 5 to 10 years
Event was virtually impossible without human-driven climate change (150 times less likely to occur in natural climate).
2017 Hurricane Harvey (rainfall)
1 in 9,000 years
Not available
Human-driven climate change made precipitation 15% more intense, increased probability of event 1.5-5x.
2020 Australian Brushfire (fire weather)
1 in 33 years
4x more likely (at least)
Part of increase in fire weather index attributed to climate change, though extent may be underrepresented in models.
2017 Bangladesh Floods
Not available.
1 – 2x more likely
Cannot say with confidence that event was caused by human-driven climate change.
2021 Western European Floods
1 in 400 years
1.2 – 1.4x more likely
Climate change influenced rainfall but flooding driven by numerous factors. Small area and extensive storm damage to monitoring equipment limits conclusiveness.
WWA combines peer-reviewed methods with considerations for how best to convey and disseminate the outcomes of each study. A recent article in Climatic Change by Geert Jan van Oldenborgh and colleagues outlines this approach (2021). While Van Oldenborgh (who passed away during the writing of this piece) and many of his co-authors spent much of their careers advancing the physical science of attribution, their work’s most lasting impact may be how they constructed a workflow that could rapidly relay attribution science’s findings to larger audiences.
The attribution process begins with several judgment calls. Extreme events are almost always happening somewhere on the planet, so researchers must first decide which extreme events to study, given limited technical resources. They must also define the event in terms of climate variables, timing, and location. Any one of these choices can influence the outcome of an attribution study and its implications. For instance, van Oldenborgh et al. (2017) found that while the probability of Hurricane Harvey precipitation happening in Houston was one in more than 9,000 years, the interval for such a storm recurring anywhere in the Gulf was only one in 800 years.
Once researchers decide to study a specific event, the next phase is collecting and analyzing observations from the affected area. Some regions of the world have better monitoring coverage than others. Importantly, reduced coverage, quality, or access to data can increase the level of uncertainty about the extent to which a particular event exceeded historical levels. This is especially true in countries with low- and middle-income countries, where technical and financial resources to establish monitoring networks have disproportionately lagged.
Similarly, some events may take place at such a small scale that statistical confidence in the extremity of the event decreases. The physical impacts of some events can also directly impair the monitoring equipment during the event itself, as was the case in the 2021 Western Europe floods, which destroyed long-term flood monitoring stations and prevented a full accounting of their magnitude.
In parallel to evaluating observational quality, the analysis phase of attribution relies on selecting climate models skillful at representing the historical distribution for the event type and region. Using models that meet a minimum performance standard helps researchers ensure they use the best possible simulated climate to compare observations. By comparing the observed world (with human emissions) and the simulated counterfactual world (without human emissions), researchers can calculate the likelihood an event is attributable to human-caused climate change. Observed events that significantly exceed ranges of variability from the counterfactual model reveal clearer fingerprints of human influence.
In characterizing conclusions, the attribution process that van Oldenborgh et al. outline attempts to provide several key results, including 1) the probability of the event occurring in the current climate, 2) the probability of the event occurring in a future climate with elevated warming, and 3) a synopsis appraisal of how (and how confidently) one can attribute the event to human-driven climate change. Often these results come with caveats, such as when modeling or observational data is limited or when climate impacts result from compounding factors (e.g., fires are often the result of heat, wind, precipitation, and various forms of ignition). Ultimately, any attribution result is probabilistic rather than unequivocal, owing to the statistical nature of how we understand the global climate.
Since the human mind gravitates toward events in the here and now, rapid response attribution studies have the potential to help people draw more tangible connections between global climate change and their own well-being. The World Weather Attribution’s approach is exciting because it showcases how the scientific community can apply new computing tools, as well as new orientations toward public service, to make their research more actionable. Ultimately, though, as the IPCC shows us with increasing confidence, every fraction of degree of warming avoided will limit the further intensification of extremes.
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Extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and more severe as climate change accelerates. Advances in modeling now make it possible to more quickly and reliably determine to what extent global warming causes individual events, offering greater opportunities to educate the public about climate change impacts.
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Energy Innovation partners with the independent nonprofit Aspen Global Change Institute (AGCI) to provide climate and energy research updates, and a full list of AGCI’s quarterly research updates covering recent climate change research on clean energy pathways is available online at https://www.agci.org/solutions/quarterly-research-reviews
Solar photovoltaic (PV) technology is pivotal in the transition to a low-carbon energy system. Yet wide-scale deployment may be hindered due to fears about sustainability tradeoffs and pockets of social resistance. For instance, deployment of PV farms can compete with agriculture for the use of the same land for food production and may create local tensions about how land is used and allocated.
However, an emerging strategy known as agrivoltaics combines solar electricity generation with agricultural production in the same location. As shown in Figure 1, more and more research is evaluating agrivoltaics for its potential to enhance land-use efficiency, climate solutions, sustainable food, and local economies. Different agrivoltaic configurations—such as combining PV with croplands, pastures, or pollinator habitats—may contribute to achieving sustainable energy and food goals simultaneously, while possibly reducing local opposition to PV deployment. This article reviews a few recent studies that uncover what researchers are finding about the myriad potential benefits of agrivoltaics.
Figure 1. Number of relevant agrivoltaic academic papers published yearly. Source: Toledo et al., 2021.
Agrivoltaic systems are shown to increase crop production, among other benefits, in drylands
A study by Barron-Gafford and colleagues compared the food, energy, and water implications of an agrivoltaic system to a traditional agriculture system in Arizona. Across the plants examined (chiltepin pepper, jalapeño, and cherry tomato), fruit production doubled in the agrivoltaic system relative to the traditional environment. Due to the cooling effect of plant transpiration on the solar panels (Figure 2), there were also marginal improvements to electricity production. The agrivoltaic PV system generated 1 percent more electricity on an annual basis (3 percent increase during summer months) compared to a regular PV system in the same location. Additionally, carbon dioxide uptake and water use efficiency were also both higher (both by 65 percent) in the agrivoltaic system, which the authors suggest aided overall productivity by reducing plant stress due to heat and drought.
Figure 2. Illustration of changes in midday energy exchange with transitions from natural systems, solar PV arrays and a collocated agrivoltaic system. a,b, Assuming equal rates of incoming energy from the sun (broken yellow arrows), a transition from a vegetated ecosystem (a) to a solar PV installation (b) will significantly alter the energy flux dynamics of the area because of the removal of vegetation, and thus the latent heat fluxes (blue arrows). This leads to greater sensible heat fluxes (red and orange arrows), which yield higher localized temperatures. c, Reintroduction of vegetation, in this case agricultural plants, restores latent heat fluxes and should reduce sensible heat loss to the atmosphere. Energy re-radiation from PV panels (teal arrows) and energy transferred to electricity (green arrows) are also shown. Arrow size and abundance correspond to the magnitude of the effect. Source: Barron-Gafford et al., 2019.
Agrivoltaic systems can support economic development of rural communities in developing countries
A recent study conducted by Choi and collaborators sought to estimate the benefits of implementing agrivoltaics in rural communities in low- and middle-income countries. The authors selected Indonesia as a test case and applied a life cycle analysis approach to estimate the effects of different land-use scenarios on greenhouse gas emissions, income, and environmental co-benefits.
The model-based results showed that “small-scale agrivoltaic systems are economically viable in certain configurations and can potentially provide co-benefits including rural electrification, retrofitting diesel electricity generation, and providing electricity for local processing of agricultural products.” The authors also noted the barrier of high capital expenditures solar, which currently may be difficult to justify absent increases in subsidies for solar or reductions in subsidies for fossil fuels.
Pasture-based agricultural processes may also be improved through agrivoltaics
Relatively less research has explored how agrivoltaics could work in pasture settings. An April 2021 research article by Andrew and colleagues in Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems conducted an experiment that monitored sheep grazing on both agrivoltaic and traditional pastures open over two years. Predictably, shady plots with solar panels generated less herbage than the sunnier, open pastures. However, lambs in both the traditional and agrivoltaic plots gained weight at nearly the same rate. The authors found reduced quantity in herbage due was made up for by higher quality forage in shady areas, possibly alongside reduced heat stress and more effective foraging behavior when sheep roamed among the PV panels. All told the comparable outcomes in lamb production between the two treatments indicate opportunities for improved land-use efficiency in an agrivoltaic pasture system.
A related study explored the opportunities of shifting conventional animal feeding operations and conventional PV farms to pasture-based arrangements that integrate PV. In Cleaner and Responsible Consumption, Pascaris and colleagues explored this potential using life cycle analysis on different scenarios of rabbit and electricity production (as shown in Figure 3). When comparing emissions from the energy utilized to mow grass in conventional PV farms and supply processed feed for conventional rabbit farms, the authors estimated substantial reductions in emissions by converting to an agrivoltaic configuration. In the agrigvoltaic scenario, rabbits fed on natural grass, eliminating the need for additional feedstock or mowing operations, resulting in sizable emissions reductions gains.
Figure 3. Comparison of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and fossil energy demand between an agrivoltaic integrated system, separate rabbit farming and PV production, and separate rabbit farming and conventional energy production. GHG emissions and fossil energy demand are broken down to show solar system, housing system (includes lighting, heating, and water), use stage (conventional rabbit feeding and vegetative maintenance of the PV array—estimated at two mows and six herbicide applications per year), and electricity. Source: Pascaris et al., 2021.
Agrivoltaic systems can restore pollinator habitat
Relative to PV with crops or PV with pasture, the most widely deployed form of dual-use PV in the United States to date is called “pollinator-friendly PV.” This type of agrivoltaic strategy installs solar arrays on top of pollinator habitat, which according to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is already utilized in more than 1 gigawatt of U.S. PV installations. A field study by Graham and colleagues published earlier this year in Nature Scientific Reports compared the composition and behavior of foraging pollinators between fully and partially shaded plots under solar arrays and on full-sun (control) plots at the Eagle Point Solar Plant in southwestern Oregon (Figure 4). Although the fully shaded areas directly beneath the panels attracted far fewer pollinating insects, the researchers observed more types and greater numbers of insects in the partial-shade plots, relative to the full-sun plots, at certain times throughout the growing season. Although pollinators were observed to actually visit plants at comparable rates between each of the treatment areas, some plants in the partial shade plots bloomed later, which the authors suggested could benefit late-season pollinators.
Figure 4. Photo (c) shows a side view of the full shade (~5 percent full sun) and partial shade (~75 percent full sun) plots used in this study. Photo (d) shows the control full sun plots in yellow, partial shade in green, and full shade in turquoise. Source: Graham et al., 2021. Note that the solar array consists of monocrystalline solar panels, which typically have the highest efficiencies and power capacity. Other types of solar panels can allow for more sunlight to go through them, therefore increasing sunlight availability underneath them. A final note is that prior to solar development, this site was used for cattle grazing, which serves as an empirical example of the land-use tensions between agriculture and utility-scale solar PV.
Agrivoltaic systems may improve public support for solar PV development
In a May 2021 pre-print posted to SocArXiv (open archive of social science research not yet under peer-review), Pascaris and colleagues reported on a survey of nearly 200 respondents across in Lubbock County, TX and Houghton County, MI. Although most of these respondents already expressed favorable attitudes toward solar deployment (72 percent), a marginally higher percentage (81 percent) indicated they would be even more supportive of local solar installations if they were combined with agriculture production. Although the results signaled that agrivoltaic proposals could further reduce local opposition, they also tracked the considerations important to communities when deliberating over solar projects – namely, that proposed agrivoltaic projects need to take into account local concerns such as how the project would provide economic benefits to farmers, the fairness in how economic benefits are distributed, the details of the siting of any new installations, and the overall alignment with local interests.
Conclusion
What can we take away from these recent studies? At the very least, each showcases the ability for agrivoltaics to increase land-use efficiency without sacrificing much in the way of either energy or food production. Furthermore, many agrivoltaic configurations appear even to enhance both food and energy production while at the same time reducing the environmental impact from pursuing each activity as a standalone.
While this area of research is still advancing, findings from these particular studies can help to inform optimal designs and standards for emerging applications of agrivoltaics. To date, little support and guidance on best-practice implementation, let alone policy, exists to foster agrivoltaic deployment. Yet if current signals in research hold up, agrivoltaics may help low-carbon energy to become synergistic with, rather than competitive with, other sustainable development goals.
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Solar power plays an essential role in the clean energy transition, but its land-use requirements put it in direct competition with agriculture. New research on agrivoltaics demonstrates the benefits of combining both solar and agricultural production including increased productivity, water conservation, and local economic development, while also bolstering public support for clean energy.
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Energy Innovation partners with the independent nonprofit Aspen Global Change Institute (AGCI) to provide climate and energy research updates. The research synopsis below comes from AGCI Program Director Emily Jack-Scott and a full list of AGCI’s quarterly research updates covering recent climate change research on clean energy pathways is available online at https://www.agci.org/solutions/quarterly-research-reviews
Something is clearly different about the wildfires roaring in the western United States. Over the last decade, we have increasingly used terms like “megafires” and “gigafires” (fires that burn more than a hundred thousand, and more than a million acres, respectively) to describe them. They’re staggering, not just in size, but also severity. Fire seasons are lasting longer, and lifelong firefighters are getting mentally and physically burned out.
Flames of the 2018 Lake Christine fire climb up “ladder fuels” into the crowns of dense forests atop Basalt Mountain in Colorado. This fire necessitated the evacuation of many residents of Basalt, CO, and the Aspen Global Change Institute office. Photo credit: Emily Jack-Scott.
We know fires have a long history in western montane ecosystems, but the fires of the last couple decades are a new beast. We’re seeing a perfect storm play out – the result of long-term fire suppression initiated by Euro-American colonists, climate change, and more people than ever building permanent dwellings in fire-prone forests (for more on wildfire attribution refer to our previous research review). We’re left with a new reality of increasingly frequent, more intense wildfires, greater loss of property and life, and a multitude of questions about what will be left when the megafires are out.
What kind of ecosystems will regenerate? How long will it take to see new growth? Will these continue to be landscapes humans and other animals can inhabit? For those of us living in the West – breathing thick smoke for weeks on end, watching neighbors and loved ones troop off for months to battle blazes – these questions are deeply personal and increasingly urgent.
The latest scientific research confirms that we must be prepared for a dramatically altered landscape in the coming decades. In 2020, Coop and colleagues published research illustrating how relatively small changes in fire behavior have widespread impacts, converting forests into non-forests over massive swaths of the West. As summarized by Coop, many researchers are forecasting fire-driven conversion of 30 to 50 percent of most western conifer-dominated forests into non-forested shrublands, grasslands or hardwood-dominated ecosystems before 2100 (Coop et al. 2020).
Figure 1. Top photo: View from atop Slate Peak in northeastern Washington, looking southwest, 1934, George Clisby photograph, National Archives, Seattle, Washington, USA. The 1934 panoramic view shows extensive evidence of prior wildfires, varied age classes of cold forest, and recently burned and recovering areas. In the same view nearly eight decades later (bottom photo, 2013, John Marshall Photography), note the complete absence of recent fire evidence, widespread ingrowth creating denser forests, loss of nonforest, and lack of forest successional heterogeneity. Source: Hessburg et al. 2021.
Historically, fire-adapted forests evolved to tolerate low- to moderate-severity fires. Because fires burned on regular intervals, forests were often more open, and understory plants were less likely to grow tall enough to serve as “ladder fuels” (serving as a ladder for fires on the ground story to climb up into the crowns of trees, escalating the fire intensity). Even if smaller younger trees perished in those fires, larger older trees could withstand the ground fires and provide a seed source for trees to regenerate amidst the grasses and shrubs that opportunistically sprout in the wake of fires.
But we’re seeing higher severity fires, in denser forests, over larger areas. As Hagmann and colleagues explore in depth in their 2021 paper, there is overwhelming evidence to confirm changing forest conditions and changing fire regimes. Fires now climb more easily up into the crowns of mature trees, and burn too hot for even thick-barked mature trees to withstand. And because our forests have lost their heterogeneity of ages and structures (see Figure 1), megafires are scorching more uniformly over broader swaths. So megafires are leaving behind tens, or even hundreds of thousands of acres scorched without enough seed trees to contribute to the usual succession of plant species that have historically regenerated after fires in the West.
Even when seed trees persist, soils can be so scorched that their life-giving nutrients actually volatilize into the atmosphere. Soil structure can be so altered that instead of absorbing water they actually repel it, rendering them far more prone to erosion. So even the most resilient of landscapes are left barren and dry after high severity fires. In these cases, it can take decades to rebuild even baseline conditions hospitable enough to support the natural succession of forests. And that’s assuming historical climatic conditions.
Climate change is creating hotter and drier conditions which further deter recovery. Seeds have a harder time germinating and growing to maturation, and fires are more frequent – sweeping through areas still in early recovery stages after the last severe burn.
These dynamics all culminate in what ecologists refer to as conversion – a transformation into a new ecological state, with new dominant species, usually filling different ecological functions. The conversion of a forest to a non-forest may happen as the result of a single large, high-severity fire, or it may happen as the result of post-fire conditions that make the burned area more likely to burn again before forest regeneration can occur (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Processes that may give rise to fire-driven forest conversion. (a) Conversion is initiated by processes that result in extensive areas of adult tree mortality (the solid arrows; red represents fire, and yellow represents climate). (b) Conversion is maintained by processes that impede regeneration of pre-fire tree species (dashed red and yellow arrows) and protract vegetation change temporally. (c) The duration of forest conversion may be further influenced by positive and negative fire–vegetation feedbacks (dashed purple arrows), which respectively promote or inhibit additional burning. Source: Coop et al. 2020.
When dense forests burn, they leave behind partially burned dead and dying trees for the next fire to re-burn in the same area. These secondary high-severity fires can actually burn hotter than the initial fire, killing off any seedlings or young trees and reinforcing conversion. This is especially true at the edges of forests, where trees are often already at the limits of tolerable growing conditions (Parks et al. 2019).
So what can be done? The scale of this challenge is massive, and outstrips current management techniques and budgets. But managers do still have the options to engage in strategic operations, especially in “high value” locations (such as in high-use recreation areas, timber stands, municipal watersheds, or near residential areas). It comes down to a choice between resisting, accepting, or directing conversion.
Coop and colleagues lay out a great framework to help inform that choice:
Use the modeling and mapping research available to assess the likelihood of fire-driven conversion in the area in question
Consider the ecological fallout of a disturbance in the area in the midst of a changing climate
Increase heterogeneity of forests at stand and landscape scales (through mechanical thinning, prescribed fires, allowing certain low- to moderate-intensity wildfires to burn, forestry operations, and strategic tree planting)
Incorporate social science into decision-making to aid managers in an increasingly difficult position to understand societal values and social acceptability of management choices, especially novel approaches that direct conversion
Hessburg and colleagues echoed many of these recommendations in a 2021 paper. They acknowledge the understandable societal resistance to large-scale management techniques – the result of broken trust as a result of extensive logging of old growth forests in the 1900s. But they make the case for intentional and proactive management of western forests in the form of prescribed fires, managed wildfires, and silvicultural treatments.
Mountain Pine Beetle-killed lodgepole pines are piled in preparation for winter pile-burning to reduce fuels at a high value recreation area on public lands near Helena, MT. Photo credit: Emily Jack-Scott.
They argue it is critical to cut through the politicization of forestry management approaches, in order for western forests to better adapt to climate change and high-severity wildfires. They advocate for application of best available science (including Indigenous and western knowledges) in designing intentional management strategies, even though there will be unavoidable uncertainty in that science. On this point, they lean into a discussion about not having the precautionary principle unnecessarily translate into inaction.
Under the precautionary principle, a decision-maker must demonstrate in the face of uncertainty that the most likely outcome is one of no harm. But given the inherent uncertainties at the convergence of changing climate and changing fire regimes, they caution against basing decisions about forest management solely on that principle. This can lead managers to assume a course of non-action, deferring to natural processes alone. Rather, they lay out a series of questions to inform decision-making under uncertainty:
“What are the uncertainties, trade-offs, and likely consequences to U.S., Canadian, and Mexican Indigenous and nonindigenous people, infrastructure, ecosystems, native species and habitats of
1) Restoring active fire regimes to dry, moist, and cold forest ecosystems,
2) Continued fire suppression in these same forest types,
3) Proposed proactive, reactive, and no-action management alternatives,
4) Post-fire forest regeneration under action and no-action alternatives, and
5) Post-fire harvest/non-harvest of the younger fire-killed trees to mimic reburns?”
Ultimately forest managers are entering a new era. The heat is on for managers to counteract the massive threats to forest resilience we’re watching unfold. They will need to find novel ways to replicate low- and moderate-fire disturbances (through selective logging, prescribed burns, and managed burns), promote forest structure heterogeneity, and protect old growth forests and drought-tolerant trees. It will look unconventional, and in reality may be experimental at times – but the alternative of nonaction renders many western forests at risk of conversion, and ultimately the loss of many of our forested habitats.
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Research shows increasingly frequent, more intense wildfires in the Western U.S. will dramatically shift the landscape over the coming decades, resulting in the conversion of forests to shrublands, grasslands, or hardwood-dominated ecosystems before 2100, but strategies such as prescribed fires, managed wildfires, and silvicultural treatments could help protect forests.
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